We build a bridge between the notions of Byzantine and Nakamoto consensus by developing a theory of proof-of-work quorums. This theory yields stochastic uniqueness of quorums as a function of the quorum size, a security parameter. We employ the theory in HotPoW, a scalable permissionless distributed log protocol that supports finality based on the pipelined three-phase commit previously presented for HotStuff [50] . Additionally, we present a simulation framework for distributed consensus protocols, which we use for evaluating the proposed protocol and variants with adversarial modifications. Results show that the protocol can tolerate network latency, churn, and targeted attacks on consistency and liveness at small overhead compared to deployed systems.
INTRODUCTION
The emergence of Bitcoin came as somewhat of a surprise to scholars in distributed systems as well as in security [11] . Authors have called the new composition of known concepts a "sweet spot" [48] in the design space for protocols, and praised the complex way the components are put together as a "true leap of insight" [39] of Nakamoto [38] . Among many interesting details, the probably most intriguing part is the way Bitcoin uses proof-of-work puzzles to secure a distributed ledger.
The role of proof-of-work in Nakamoto consensus can be contemplated in several ways. First and most intuitively, the computational puzzles can be interpreted as rate limit on new identities, which discourage Sybil attacks [21] in a lottery for blocks and new coins. Second, proof-of-work can be conceived as a game-proof variant of a probabilistic back-off mechanism, as known from media access control in computer networks. It reduces the risk of collisions when many nodes concurrently seek for write access to a shared medium, the ledger. The first interpretation emphasizes the throttling aspect, whereas the second stresses the competitive leadership election and the source of randomness. Formalizations of selected properties, which serve as interfaces to cryptographic security models, make yet another set of simplifications. For example, Garay et al. [25] discretize time in rounds. All these models of proof-of-work are helpful in some way, but arguably none of them hits the mark.
Another widely held belief is that proof-of-work enables permissionless systems, but the price to pay is eventual consistency. This would imply that state updates are never truly final. Indeed, many of Bitcoin's security issues relate to the lack of finality, a technical fact that even central banks seem to care about [2] .
Against this backdrop, our research question is: Whether and under which conditions can a permissionless distributed log based on proof-of-work support finality? We claim that the answer is yes, by proposing a protocol as positive example. Moreover, we explore the conditions analytically and by simulation.
Our approach starts with building a theory of proof-of-work quorums. As a side effect, this theory helps to clarify the role of proof-of-work with few assumptions, and without resorting to analogies. The proposed protocol is inspired by two recent (in our opinion) breakthroughs: HotStuff [50] , which stands in the tradition of Byzantine fault tolerance and will be deployed in Facebooks's cryptocurrency Libra [5] , and Bobtail [9] , which continues a line of work optimizing Nakamoto consensus.
Both predecessors exploit the fact that consensus is found repeatedly to secure a distributed log. Distributed logs are the enabling concept for total order broadcast and state machine replication. They are sufficient as platform for arbitrary application (transaction) logic, including the ones of Bitcoin and Ethereum, two examples for widely adopted practical systems. Therefore, this work can be agnostic about the application logic. It only studies how the log can be implemented.
We make the following contributions:
(1) We develop a theory of proof-of-work quorums, which means that quorums are formed over votes generated by stochastic processes. This theory gives us a closed form for the probability of quorum uniqueness (Section 2). (2) We propose, specify, and explain HotPoW, a protocol that finds consensus over a distributed log without requiring predefined identities. Asymptotically, HotPoW scales at least as well as practical blockchain protocols and much better than Byzantine fault tolerance protocols. HotPoW relies on proofof-work, but unlike deployed systems, our construction supports a three-phase commit logic. State updates (transactions) are final after a predictable amount of time, and the probability of inconsistency is bounded according to our theory (Section 3). (3) We build an evaluation framework that simulates the stochastic process and the execution of HotPoW as well as variants of it with adversarial modifications. Simulation results show that the protocol can tolerate network latency, churn, and targeted attacks on consistency and liveness at small overhead compared to deployed systems (Section 4).
The final Section 5 positions our proposal in the broader design space of consensus protocols and discusses possible extensions.
The failure modes PoW-1 and PoW-2 correspond to the Byzantine failure modes BFT-1 and BFT-2. Our goal is to understand the new failure mode PoW-3 and how it affects the potential nonuniqueness of quorums.
We reduce proof-of-work to the property of generating random events under resource consumption. Definition 2.1 (Proof-of-work process). A proof-of-work process is a stochastic count process where each count event assigns one ability to vote (ATV) to one agent. Each ATV can be used by the agent it is assigned to, to vote once for one value.
We adopt the notion of a quorum from the distributed systems literature [37, 50] , which calls a set of 2f + 1 votes for the same value x a quorum for x. This guarantees uniqueness in the standard setting with n nodes of which maximum f are faulty. Our setting differs from the standard setting in that the assignment of voting rights to agents follows a proof-of-work process. Hence, we need a new way to reason about the uniqueness of quorums.
Definition 2.2 (n-quorum).
We call a set of n votes for the same value x an n-quorum for x.
From observing an n-quorum, we learn that at least n ATVs have been used. This is only possible if the proof-of-work process has assigned at least n ATVs.
Definition 2.3 (Optimistic quorum time).
The time at which the proof-of-work process assigns the n-th ATV is called the optimistic n-quorum time. The optimistic quorum time is a random variable T P,n . For a proof-of-work process P and quorum size n it is formally defined by T P,n := inf {t ∈ R ≥0 | P(t) ≥ n} .
The optimistic quorum time T P,n describes the time at which an n-quorum is first feasible. An n-quorum is only possible at T P,n , if all assigned ATVs are used for the same value. This is why we call it optimistic.
Since uniqueness is not guaranteed, we have to consider ambiguity. A quorum for x is ambiguous if there is another quorum for x. Since each ATV can be used for at most one value, ambiguous n-quorums are only possible when the proof-of-work process has assigned 2n ATVs.
Definition 2.4 (Probability of ambiguity).
For a proof-of-work process P and quorum size n we define the probability of ambiguity (POA) as poa P,n (t) := Pr P(t) ≥ 2n .
Remark (Bitcoin). The proof-of-work used in Bitcoin implies exponentially distributed time for finding a single puzzle solution.
The finder of a puzzle solution may propose a new block. The solving times for the block puzzles are independent and identically distributed with rate parameter λ = 0.1 solutions per minute. In our terms, Bitcoin uses a quorum size of n = 1 and a Poisson process P λ for assigning the ATVs. L 2.5. The POA for the Poisson process P λ is given by
A Poisson process has the following properties [12] :
) for all s < t, and (3) for n ∈ N and 0 < t 1 < · · · < t n , the family of random variables
is stochastically independent. According to Definition 2.4,
By setting s = 0 in property 2 of the Poisson process and using property 1, we conclude that P λ (t) ∼ Poisson(λt). By evaluating the cumulative distribution function of the Poisson distribution
for k = 2n − 1 and λ ′ = λt, we obtain the stated result. The density of the distribution of the optimistic n-quorum time based on the Poisson process P λ with rate λ = n/10 (minutes). L 2.6. The optimistic n-quorum time for the Poisson process is Erlang distributed with shape parameter n and rate parameter λ, in short T P λ ,n ∼ Erlang(n, λ) .
P .
The time between two consecutive count events of P λ is exponentially distributed with rate parameter λ. The times between any two consecutive count events are stochastically independent. The sum of n independent and identically distributed exponential random variables is Erlang distributed [12] with shape parameter n and rate parameter λ. C 2.7. The expected optimistic n-quorum time for the Poisson process ist λ,n := n/λ .
P
. The statement follows from Lemma 2.6 and the definition of the Erlang distribution [12] . Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of the optimistic n-quorum time for n ∈ {1, 2, 16} based on the Poisson process. We fixt λ,n to 10 minutes in order to make quorum sizes greater one comparable to an ideal Bitcoin (n = 1). This is achieved by setting λ = n/10. Figure 2 shows the POA for different quorum sizes as a function of time. Again, we vary the rate of the underlying Poisson process such that the expected optimistic n-quorum time is 10 minutes. Observe that the POA increases over time as the number of ATVs grows monotonically. More importantly, the POA at the expected optimistic quorum time decreases in the quorum size n.
In order to isolate the effect of n, we evaluate the POA at fixed timet λ,n , which lends itself to a closed form. C 2.8. For the Poisson process, the POA at expected optimistic n-quorum time is given by Figure 3: The probability of quorum ambiguity at the timē t λ,n when we expect the first quorum as a function of quorum size n. P . Inserting Corollary 2.7 into Lemma 2.5 yields the stated expression.
Observe that the POA at expected optimistic quorum time is independent of λ. This is useful as λ may measure the total compute capacity in proof-of-work networks, which is not necessarily known to each agent. Figure 3 shows the POA as a function of the quorum size n at the expected optimal quorum timet λ,n . We observe that the POA decreases exponentially for increasing n. C 2.9. The POA for the Poisson process at timet λ,n is negligible in n. If we adopt the common definition of negligibility in cryptography (i. e., asymptotic decline faster than any polynomial), then the quorum size n is a security parameter.
Remark (Validation on Bitcoin). For Bitcoin parameters (n = 1, λ = 0.1), we get a POA att λ,n of p = 0.2642. This part of the theory can be validated on historical data. We estimate the expected block delay by averaging the differences between consecutive block time stamps for the two years 2017 and 2018. 1 The estimated average block delay ist = 9.52 minutes. The proportion of blocks that arrived withint after their second predecessor isp = 0.2606. We expect this estimate to be slightly below the theoretical value p because our historic Bitcoin data does not contain orphan blocks. We can conclude that the theory applies in this case.
The intuition from this theory for protocol design is that larger n-quorums reduce the probability of ambiguity and the variance in quorum time. The exponential decay makes it conceivable to choose parameters such that ambiguity becomes negligible in certain applications. This allows the protocol designer to use an approximate notion of uniqueness in a permissionless system.
HOTPOW
In this section, we propose a distributed log protocol that is secured by a proof-of-work process (Def. 2.1) and n-quorums (Def. 2.2). Our proposal is based on HotStuff [49, 50] , which integrates BFT and blockchain concepts. HotStuff achieves safety based on the uniqueness of Byzantine quorums and a three-step commitment rule. We transfer this construction to permissionless systems based on our notion of approximate quorum uniqueness developed in Section 2.
Design Considerations
Algorithm 1 shows the proposed protocol "HotPoW". We avoid ambiguity by providing a self-contained excerpt of our draft implementation in OCaml. 2 We provide the formal interfaces of the omitted modules in Appendix A. Figure 5 illustrates the interfaces between the consensus protocol and other components of the software stack. The complete implementation is provided as a supplement. 3 3.1.1 Blockchain as Pipeline. HotPoW inherits from HotStuff the idea of pipelining a three-phase commit protocol in a distributed log (see Fig. 4 ). Blocks are values, on which the participants achieve consensus consecutively. Since each block carries a quorum for its predecessor, quorums are nested. A quorum for a block is also a quorum on the quorum of the predecessor and a three leveledquorum confirmation of the second predecessor.
3.1.2 Proof-of-work. Alternatively, HotPoW can be interpreted as an extension of Bitcoin [38] . We keep the main data structure -the hash-linked list or blockchain -but modify the rules for appending new elements. Bitcoin requires a single solution to a proof-of-work puzzle for each new entry. HotPoW requires an n-quorum for the predecessor.
3.1.3 Vote. Votes are represented as triples (lnk, id, s), where lnk is a reference to a previous block, id is a pseudonym of the voter, and s is a solution to a proof-of-work puzzle, which creates the ATV. These triples are pseudo-randomly mapped to integers by a non-malleable hash function H weight . The proof-of-work puzzle requires a solution s such that H weight (lnk, id, s) is small. This weight function H weight is implemented in Weight.weigh. Note that our requirements for this hash function do not differ from Bitcoin's hash function.
3.1.4
orum. As defined in Section 2, an n-quorum is a set of n votes for the same value. We represent such quorums as lists. Since lnk is the same in all votes, it is omitted from the list entries. A list L = [id i , s i ] represents a valid n-quorum for lnk, if the following conditions hold:
(
The difficulty of the proof-of-work challenge can be adjusted by setting the threshold t. The third condition is a generalization of Bitcoin's threshold rule, which we adopt from the Bobtail protocol proposal [9] . In Algorithm 1, t and n are represented by the constants quorum_threshold and quorum_size. The function valid_quorum verifies quorum validity in the above sense.
We claim that this quorum implementation can be modelled by a proof-of-work quorum based on the Poisson process P λ as defined in Section 2. We argue that our results on the probability of ambiguity translate to our proposed protocol.
Leader Election.
A quorum can only be formed at optimistic quorum time (see Def. 2.3), when all agents vote for the same value. We facilitate coordination on one value by electing a leader who is responsible for proposing a new block. This election is based on the proof-of-work quorum: the leader is identified by the first vote. (Recall from the second condition of valid quorums that votes are ordered by H weight .) We require the id part of each vote to be a public key, which ensures that leaders can authenticate the block proposal with a digital signature. The functionality of digital signatures is encapsulated in the DSA module. The function valid_block verifies whether a block carries a valid quorum and was proposed by the associated leader.
3.1.6 Proposing. Each nodes tries to assemble a quorum with itself as leader. Each time a vote is delivered (on_receive) or found locally (on_atv), it is added to a vote store (PollClerk) that encapsulates the logic of assembling quorums with the own identity as leader. This module ensures that only unique votes are added. Whenever a quorum with the node as leader is possible, the node assembles a new block and broadcasts it to the network (see propose function).
Block Preference. Nodes prefer the longest chain of blocks.
In case of blocks with conflicting height, nodes enforce the leadership rule by preferring the block where the smallest vote has smaller weight (see better function).
When receiving a better block (on_receive), the node updates the lnk value of its future votes to follow the longest chain of blocks (see prefer function). The block preference is also revisited with every received vote to support the lnk which has accumulated the largest progress. Progress is measured towards the expected work required to complete the quorum.
3.1.8 Voting. Each node actively participates in the quorum finding process by computing ATVs (see function work). With appropriate choice of H weight , the most efficient way to do this is by iterating over the space of solutions and repeatedly checking the weight of the vote. If the vote is small enough (≤ vote_threshold), the node checks whether it can complete a quorum as leader with the propose function. If no proposal is possible, the node broadcasts the vote to the other participants. The choice of vote_threshold depends on the performance of the broadcast network. It can be adjusted dynamically within each round and enforced on the network layer to prevent congestion.
3.1.9 Application. We can implement arbitrary application logic on top of the distributed log protocol [36, 45] . We assume that this logic is hidden in the App module. Similar to deployed blockchain protocols, the application proposes and verifies state updates as implemented through App.propose and App.verify, respectively. Specific to HotPoW, incoming state updates that our protocol considers final are executed using App.apply.
3.1.10 Commit Rule. All payloads of blocks with at least three quorum confirmations are executed (function commit_upto). Three confirmations imply safety under the assumption of unique quorums [49] . In the light of Conjecture 2.9, we claim that HotPoW's proof-of-work quorums become practically unique when the quorum size is chosen large enough. If this holds, HotStuff's safety result translates to our proposed protocol.
HotPoW, like HotStuff, fixes the number of confirmations in order to achieve finality. By contrast, Bitcoin lets users choose the number of confirmations according to descriptive norms (six as rule of thumb ≈ 1 hour), their preferences, and risk considerations on the application layer (e. g., the value of transactions at risk). Therefore, Bitcoin can reach eventual consistency at best.
3.1.11 Block. The central data structure of the protocol is a hashlinked list of blocks. Each block persistently and verifiably stores a hash reference to its predecessor (parent), a proof-of-work quorum for this predecessor, a payload (body), and a proof of leadership (signature). The block's payload body is a state update to the application implemented on top of the distributed log.
The references to parent blocks are established by the collisionresistant hash function H link , which is implemented in the Link.hash function. Nodes store valid blocks indexed by their reference using the BlockStore module.
3.1.12 Communication. The network layer is abstracted by the Broadcast.send function and the assumption that messages are delivered using the on_receive function, which handles both votes and block proposals. There may be other forms of communication on the application layer (e. g., exchanging transaction information), which are not relevant in this context.
Incentives
It is possible to motivate participation in HotPoW by giving rewards to finders of proof-of-work puzzle solutions. For each vote, the application logic can assign a reward to the vote's id. Claiming the reward for (lnk, id, s) depends on knowledge of the secret key corresponding to id. This requires that the application logic supports some kind of transferable virtual asset that (at least partly) fulfills the functions of money. Money is a social construct and hence we abstain from engineering it here.
If money is assumed, one can start to reason about the reward scheme. Bissias and Levine [9] argue that the combination of the threshold rule and a constant reward per vote in a valid quorum yields a fair outcome. HotPoW could adopt this scheme from Bobtail. However, finding the optimal reward is not trivial as the utility of the reward outside the system may affect the willingness to participate in the system and thereby make λ endogenous [20, 43] . This means that rewards have to be treated in combination with the assumptions preventing the failure modes PoW-1 and PoW-2. We are not aware of a single protocol analysis that offers a convincing solution to this problem.
On a more general note, designing protocols like economic mechanisms by incentivizing desired behavior sounds attractive because there is some hope that the assumption of honest nodes can be replaced by a somewhat weaker assumption of rational agents [26, 30] . Within this track, Badertscher et al. [3] present positive results for Bitcoin in a discrete round execution model and under assumption of a constant exchange rate. However, many roadblocks remain. Agents' actions are not fully observable (e. g., information withholding) and preference orders are not fully knowable, hence rationality is not precisely defined. Side-payments (bribes), priority queue which cannot be ruled out, pose an insurmountable challenge for mechanism design [10, 13, 32] . For distributed logs, which work inherently sequential, this approach may even be thwarted by fundamental negative results on the existence of unique equilibria in repeated games [6, 24] . For all these reasons, we refrain from dealing with the mechanism design aspects and limit our contribution to transferring Byzantine consensus to proof-of-work scenarios. In other words, HotPoW supports incentives as a means to encourage participation, but its security intentionally does not rely on incentives.
EVALUATION
We evaluate our protocol proposal in a simulated network, similarly to as it was done before for Bitcoin [15, 27] . Our simulation framework is based on a central priority queue of events, where keys represent points in time. There are three types of events: ATV, Broadcast and Deliver. Events are scheduled by inserting them into the queue. The simulation maintains state for all simulated nodes separately. Node zero has a special role. It can be instantiated with modified logic in order to simulate an attacker. All other nodes follow the protocol. The main loop of the simulation takes events from the queue and handles them by interacting with the nodes in the following way (also see Fig. 6 ).
ATV. The simulation randomly and independently assigns an ATV to a node. It executes the assignment by invoking on_atv on the receiving node. Then, it schedules the next ATV with a random, exponentially distributed time delta. This simulates a proofof-work process according to Def. 2.1.
The simulation does not preform actual work by setting vote_threshold to the maximum weight. We set parameter
which leaves sufficient safety margin below the theoretical expected value of 1/2. This avoids that votes with heigh weight are dropped too early in the simulation, at the cost of increasing the simulation complexity.
Broadcast. Broadcast events are scheduled whenever a node invokes Broadcast.send. The simulation schedules Deliver events for each node except the sender. In this step, the simulation injects latency and simulates churn and leader failure.
Deliver i. The simulation calls on_receive on the i-th node with the message previously given to Broadcast.send.
The simulation code is part of the supplementary material. 4 All upcoming results are based on simulations of 100 nodes over 1000 consecutive blocks. We aggregate the results of 20 independent executions using the arithmetic mean.
Robustness
We evaluate the robustness of the proposed protocol on scenarios for latency, churn, and leader failure. In all simulations we check for inconsistent committed state. Such forks only happen for extreme latencies and small quorum sizes (see Figure 7) . We conclude that consistency is given under practical circumstances.
Latency.
We model the effect of latency by injecting a random time delay between broadcast send and message delivery. We draw delays from an exponential distribution with fixed expectation independently for each node and delivery. Latency causes temporary state inconsistencies. In these periods, nodes spend their ATVs on extending superseded blocks, or even produce temporal forks. Figure 7 shows the effect of latency on the expected time to commit. We observe that latencies below 1 % of the expected block time (Bitcoin: 6 seconds) have no visible negative impact, while latencies in the order of 10 % of the expected block time (Bitcoin: 60 seconds) delay a commit cycle by 20 %. Since empirical analyses [17, 19] and other simulations [27] suggest that the propagation time of blocks (≈ 500 KB) in Bitcoin is about 9 seconds, we can argue that HotPoW tolerates practical latencies. In HotPoW, most sent messages are votes. These are much smaller than a block and the practical latency should be even smaller as well. This suggests that HotPoW can run on the Internet with substantially lower expected block time than 10 minutes.
Churn.
A certain fraction (churn rate) of nodes does not actively participate in the protocol for 10 times the expected block time. During that time, the passive nodes can receive ATVs but do not send or receive messages. Accordingly, the ATVs assigned to passive nodes represent lost work and the time to commit is expected to grow linearly with increasing churn rate: if 50 % of the nodes are passive, the time to commit is twice as long, independent of the quorum size. Figure 8 shows the results of the simulation, which support this claim.
Leader Failure.
Truthful leaders may fail to propose blocks due to network failures or targeted attacks on the network layer. We model such failures by dropping each block proposal randomly with constant probability (leader failure rate). For traditional proof-of-work protocols, lost proposals imply as much wasted work. In HotPoW, work can be reused for different proposals. Honest nodes reveal at most one new vote with their proposal. Accordingly, a lost proposal wastes at most the work of one vote. We expect the protocol to become more tolerant to leader failure with increasing quorum size. Figure 9 shows simulation results that support this claim. For perspective, the right end of the graph simulates a situation in which an attacker can monitor all nodes' network traffic and disconnect nodes at discretion with 50 % success probability. Still, the time to commit is almost unaffected for large quorum sizes.
Overall, it seems that a reasonable choice of quorum size can effectively mitigate targeted attacks on the network layer. This leads us to the discussion of attacks on the protocol layer. 
Security
Adopting the convention in the Byzantine setting, we assume two agents. The total compute power λ is distributed over the agents according to the ratio α. The attacker possess α · λ compute power, the honest agent the rest. We assume that the honest agent operates nodes that follow the protocol as specified, while the attacker may deviate from the specification in order to reach his objective. Zhang and Preneel [51] provide an evaluation framework for proof-of-work cryptocurrencies that allows to evaluate for the different security aspects chain quality, incentive compatibility, subversion gain, and censorship susceptibility. They highlight that security the analyses supplied with new cryptocurrency protocol proposals usually evaluate only a subset of these aspects. Interestingly, their evaluation based on Markov Decision Process (MDP) models allow to conclude that all analysed alternatives to Nakamoto consensus fall short on at least one of the four aspects. The fact that the authors of [51] are aware of Bobtail, but do not provide a MDP model for this protocol proposal, as well as private communication with the authors of Bobtail itself indicates that a full analysis of Bobtail/HotPoW-style protocols based on MDP is not easily possible. We thus resort to informal reasoning and simulation and leave the MDP model for further work.
As mentioned, node zero implements the attacker in our simulation environment. The allocation of ATVs to nodes is biased in favor of node zero according to the choice of α.
Subversion Gain.
Subversion gain mostly relates to double spending, were the attacker wants at least one of the honest nodes (the merchant) to act on inconsistent state. HotPoW supports commits, hence we do not need to consider the possibility of rewriting the longer history nor the double spending of uncommitted transactions. 5 Both problems apply to Bitcoin and are extensively studied there [1, 13, 27, 31, 33] .
The only remaining attack strategy is splitting the network so that the recipients of at least two double-spent transactions commit to different states. This loss of consistency would materialize in forks that require out-of-band resolutions.
In order to understand how HotPoW ensures consistency, it is instructive to recall the block preference rule in Sect. 3.1.7. Assume for a moment that nodes never update their value according to received votes but blindly apply the longest chain rule. Then, an attacker who becomes the leader could send different proposals to each node. This would split the honest nodes' compute power in many small pieces and give the attacker time to form six quorums, three per conflicting state. The probability of the attacker becoming leader is at least α in each round. Therefore, blindly following the longest chain rule exposes the system to a catastrophic attack.
Our block preference rule selects the value with the highest progress among all received votes. Therefore, as soon as one vote is received from an honest node, all honest nodes converge to a single preferred value. As a result, the attacker would have to form six quorums in the time the honest nodes get assigned a single ATV. We argue that such an attack becomes infeasible for bigger quorum sizes.
Censoring.
The attacker wants to control the value on which consensus is achieved for a longer period of time. This means he has to be elected as leader in multiple (k) consecutive blocks.
We assume that the leader election is independent of the previous rounds. We analyze the probability of the attacker becoming the leader for a round by simulating a protocol execution and calculating the ratio of committed attacker blocks. A naive attacker, who follows the protocol as specified, leads a single round with probability α. From the independence of rounds, we conclude that censoring HotPoW for k consecutive blocks using the naive strategy succeeds with probability α k .
Taking inspiration from the work on selfish mining [23, 34, 44] , we argue that an attacker can improve on the naive strategy by withholding information. For Nakamoto consensus, withholding information implies withholding complete blocks, such that other miners spend mining capacity on an irrelevant part of the chain. In HotPoW there exists a more granular type of information: an attacker might withhold his votes. A censoring attacker would release his votes only when the release implies leadership. In practice, this means that a censoring attacker does not share votes, but only proposes blocks. Using this strategy, the attacker can delay the next quorum until the honest nodes can form one without the attacker's votes. This time window increases the attacker's chance of becoming the leader.
We implement this censor strategy (see Appendix A.3) and evaluate it in our simulation framework by instantiating the strategy in node zero. Besides the number of forks, we count how many of the committed blocks are proposed by the attacker node and thereby estimate the probability of leadership per round. Forks do not happen. Figure 10 shows the leadership ratio as a function of the quorum size for different attacker strengths α. We observe that this -to the best of our knowledge -optimal withholding strategy is not a major security concern for HotPoW. 
4.2.3
Chain ality and Incentive Compatibility. The prevalent strategy for increasing the own share in blocks and rewards is selfish mining [23] . This attack is inherently connected with incentives. Its basic idea is to withhold and strategically release blocks in order to create an information asymmetry that allows to reap a disproportional amount of rewards for the invested share of work. This idea is not directly transferrable from Nakamoto consensus to HotPoW for three reasons. First, the finality after three blocks substantially limits the horizon of the selfish miner. Second, block proposals are less valuable. They are not significant sources of reward. Third, block proposals are less critical. In fact, block withholding reduces to the situation of leader failure. Since votes can be reused, honest nodes can replace missing proposals very fast (see Section 4.1.3). This makes proposals less rare events than in Nakamoto consensus, limiting the strategic advantage of withholding them.
However, as we have argued in Section 4.2.2, it is a valid strategy to withhold votes. Therefore, we analyze the effect of vote withholding on the distribution of rewards, assuming a constant reward per committed vote, like in Bobtail [9] . While the naive strategy yields a share of α of the rewards, the attacker's goal is to maximize the number of votes he contributes to each quorum. Since only the leader can decide which votes are included in a proposed quorum, the first step of optimal vote withholding is to increase the chance of becoming the leader. This, in turn, can be achieved by withholding votes! The circularity indicates that the attack can be best approximated with the censoring strategy. Figure 11 shows simulation results on how the strategy, α, and the quorum size affect the share of attacker votes committed to the chain. Interestingly, the censor receives fewer rewards (in particular for small quorum sizes) than honest nodes and naive attackers, indicating a dilemma between paying for becoming the leader and capitalizing the power of leadership. The tradeoff is visible by comparing Figures 10 and 11 . It points to a potentially interesting economic argument that falls beyond the scope of this work. The tradeoff also appears for the so-called "proof withholding" strategy [9] , which shares essential properties with the censoring strategy in HotPoW.
Overhead
HotPoW requires O(n) messages per block, where n is the quorum size. It is constant in the number of nodes, like Bitcoin. The main differences that may matter is the size of the block header, since HotPoW requires to store the complete valid quorum containing n proof-of-work solutions. This overhead is relevant because it must be replicated in all nodes who want to verify the integrity of the blockchain in the future. Table 1 shows the storage overhead per block as a function of n and the associated probability of ambiguity at expected optimistic quorum time (Corollary 2.8). We conservatively assume a public key of 256 bits and a proof-of-work solution of 64 bits. (Bitcoin shortens public keys to 160 bits and uses proof-of-work solutions of 32 bits.) Even in the most robust case analyzed (n = 256), the overhead is about 1 % of Bitcoin's current block size. In this case, falsely accepting a quorum as unique is much less likely than guessing a 128-bit key in one attempt. We argue that the benefits of the protocol outweigh its storage costs.
DISCUSSION
This section positions HotPoW in the design space of consensus protocols, reflects on our assumptions and limitations, and sketches promising avenues for future work.
Design Space
We observe a huge amount of proposal for distributed log protocols in the wild. We do not claim to know all of them and we do not attempt to provide a complete map of the design space, since other works have specialized on this task [4, 14] . Instead, in the following we relate HotPoW to some close relatives on a limited number of dimensions (see Table 2 ).
Order of target size. Early BFT protocols were designed with a small target size in mind. PBFT [16] is a prominent example. It is proven secure under the typical Byzantine assumptions BFT-1 and BFT-2. PBFT requires multiple rounds of voting for reaching consensus on a single value. The O(n 2 ) complexity of each communication round makes is practical for only a limited number of nodes n.
HotStuff is secure under the same assumptions as PBFT [49] , but increases the rate of confirmed values to one per round of voting. Its key idea is to pipeline the commit phases of iterative consensus (recall Fig. 4) . Additionally, it reduces communication complexity to O(n) by letting all nodes communicate with via the current leader instead of a broadcast network. The two changes make HotStuff practical for larger networks. However, all n nodes must actively participate (send messages) during each round.
Subset forms committee. Protocols designed with even larger scale in mind reduce communication complexity by limiting the number of active nodes per round. These protocols shift power between terms by electing committees. The subset of nodes that are part of the committee actively communicate by sending messages. Other nodes passively observe until they become part of a committee.
In Bobtail [9] and HotPoW, multiple proof-of-work puzzles are solved during each term. Consequently the committee size can be greater than one. Bitcoin can be interpreted as corner case with committee size one. During each term (block interval), one nodethe finder of the block -broadcasts a message.
Also proof-of-stake protocols follow this approach, with committee membership being tied to the possession of transferrable digital assets (stake).
Permissioned. As stated earlier (Sec. 2), BFT-1 can only be satisfied by restricting access to the network based on identities assigned by an external identity provider or gatekeeper. Consequently, protocols relying on this assumption are permissioned on the network layer.
Proof-of-stake internalizes the gatekeeping functionality by restricting access to the committee based on the distribution of stake. While participating as node may happen without permission, access to the committee is still permissioned. In proof-of-work systems any agent can join and leave the network and has a (fair) chance of becoming committee member without obtaining permission from a gatekeeper. 6 Resource binding. Proof-of-work can be seen as a commitment of resources to a value. Creating a proof-of-work for a specific value consumes resources. The resources are bound to a value.
Typically, these values are chosen locally on each node. Freshness is guaranteed by including a reference to recent puzzle solutions in the value. Only completed commitments are shared and can the resource binding can be verified by others.
We distinguish whether the resources are bound to a proposal (BTP) for an upcoming value, or whether they are bound to an identifier (BTI) used for entering the committee.
Bitcoin uses BTP. Nodes form a proposal for the next block locally and then start to solve a proof-of-work for this proposal. If they are successful in finding a puzzle solution, they share their proposal. This process is depicted in the upper half of Figure 12 .
By contrast, HotPoW uses BTI. Nodes choose an identifier and try to solve a proof-of-work for this identifier. If they are successful in finding a puzzle solution, they form a vote or proposal and broadcast it. This alternative order of events in depicted in the lower half 6 We ignore the role of the supply chain for puzzle solving equipment. of Figure 12 . These identifiers can be ephemeral pseudonyms and are not necessarily linkable to the identity of the agent.
Bitcoin-NG [22] combines both approaches. The distributed log of Bitcoin-NG has two kinds of entries. So-called key blocks can be appended by solving a BTP-style proof-of-work. They contain an identifier of the leader. This identifier can then be used to append microblocks to the log until the next key block emerges.
Finality. Bitcoin's lack of finality opened many opportunities for attacks. So far, according to conventional wisdom, it has been accepted as the price of a truly permissionless system. The high risk of inconsistency due to the stochastic nature of proof-of-work precluded a convention to commit after a fixed number of blocks. HotPoW challenges this view by proposing a way to reduce the stochastic uncertainty in proof-of-work quorums. These quorums can serve as basis for HotStuff's innovative commit pipeline in a permissionless system.
Other important developments not included in Table 2 can be broadly divided into two strands. First, many proposals seek to overcome the scalability issues of Bitcoin by running permissioned consensus protocols on identities established on an underlying permissionless blockchain [18, 35, 42] . HotPoW differs by integrating both layers into one. This removes the need for cross-layer optimization. Second, some proposals replace the linear data structure of the distributed log with more general directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) [41, 46, 47] . This promises higher scalability and faster first confirmation in latent networks at the cost of imposing different requirements on the application layer. For example, Fruitchain [41] recognizes solutions to hard and easy puzzles. It hides the DAG from the application layer by not allowing 'fruits' to carry state updates. A commonality with HotPoW and Bobtail [9] is the idea to partition work into smaller units and increase the share of work actually used to secure the authenticated data structure. In the simplest form, adopted in Ethereum, referencing orphaned blocks ensures that the resources bound in them are not lost.
Reflection on Assumptions
We presented a protocol that achieves finality in a permissionless setting under axiomatic exclusion of the failure modes PoW-1 and PoW-2, and the acceptance of a small failure probability. The assumption on PoW-1 and PoW-2 are also made for security proofs for Bitcoin [25, 40] . Nevertheless, it is worth considering whether the assumptions are reasonable.
Excluding PoW-1 corresponds to assuming a fixed, networkwide compute power λ. We cannot expect this to hold in the permissionless setting where agents can add and remove nodes at their willing. We observe in practice that a control loop, like Bitcoin's difficulty adjustment, can compensate changes of λ up to a certain degree. Sudden changes in compute power might be problematic. We argue that proof-of-work quorums are beneficial in this case: increasing the quorum size while keeping a fixed block delay implies a higher ATV rate. Accordingly, more ATVs can be observed per time, which enables a more accurate and faster estimation of λ.
The same effect can be used for detecting network-level attacks, such as eclipse and splits (see Appendix B). This is relevant in the context of the CAP theorem [29] , which tells us that every distributed system has to sacrifice one out of consistency, availability and partition tolerance. HotPoW, as presented, favors availability over consistency. It does not implement a mechanism for detecting network splits, even though it is possible at high confidence for big quorum sizes. The trade-off could be changed in favor of consistency. If a split is detected, the protocol withholds commits (and may notify the application layer in order to trigger out-ofband resolutions).
The second failure mode PoW-2 causes severe trouble and is hard to argue against. An agent cannot rule out the rest of the network collaborating against him. We are not aware of an argument for α being bound to a constant below 50 % for any proof-of-work protocol. In fact, >50 % attacks have been launched against smaller instances of Nakamoto consensus in practice.
Future Work
The results presented so far can serve as starting points for future research. We outline the in our opinion most promising directions.
Simulation at global scale. We have evaluated HotPoW on an ideal broadcast network with simulated latency. A suitable extension would be to evaluate it on a peer-to-peer network with more realistic latencies, ideally at internet scale. The parameter of interest is the shortest practical time to commit, which tells us which kinds of applications HotPoW could support in principle.
Block header compression. In Sect. 4.3, we assumed that each vote stored within a quorum contains a 256 bit public key. For bigger quorum sizes it might be worth exploring whether this overhead can be reduced. HotPoW could be extended to make the votes id short lived. Theoretically, the identifiers have to be used only once for claiming the reward, or twice in case of leadership. This gives room to consider shorter public keys or even one-time signature schemes.
Security proofs. So far, we have evaluated HotPoW against a small number of attacks known from existing systems. There might be modifications of the discussed attacks or even unrelated, new attacks that HotPoW does not handle as well. Such threats should be ruled out by constructing a security proof in a suitable security model, as it was done for Bitcoin [25, 40] . Also the assumed generalization of HotStuff's properties on proof-of-work-quorums could be supported with formal arguments. Finally, a proof of Conjecture 2.9 would tie proof-of-work quorums with security parameter n more closely to common cryptographic security models. [51] show that security proofs for many recent cryptocurrency protocols fall short in addressing all relevant security aspects (see Section 4.2). They provide a framework for evaluation and comparison of proof-of-work protocols that is based on modelling the execution as Markov decision process. The design of such a MDP model for HotPoW would allow to gain confidence in the security of our proposal.
MPD model. Zhang and Preneel
HotPoW-NG. Bitcoin-NG [22] separates leadership election from the proposal of new blocks, not much different to HotPoW. Bitcoin-NG allows the current proposer to sign intermediate microblocks in order to increase transaction throughput. It might be possible to transfer this idea to HotPoW.
HotPoS. In its current state, HotPoW sources ATVs in proof-ofwork puzzles. It might be possible to replace this mechanism with puzzles of the style of Algorand [28] . This would give a proof of stake version of HotPoW: HotPoS.
HotPoX. Finally, it might be worthwhile to explore if the theory in Sect. 2 can be generalized to proof-of-work puzzles with different (and possibly not independent) distribution of solving time. This would connect to the literature on proof-of-work puzzles with special properties, verifiable delay functions, and possibly useful proof-of-work.
Concluding Remarks
We understand HotPoW as a positive example to support our claim that it is possible to build permissionless distributed logs based on proof-of-work with finality, as stated in our research question. The question is tentatively answered until HotPoW is broken. 7 We invite the community to prove our claim wrong, and provide running code in the supplemental material to facilitate this task. 8 It is not safe to use this code in systems dealing with real values.
Regardless of whether our claim is true or false, the theory of quorums on stochastic processes may find applications elsewhere. Since it entails Nakamoto consensus as special case, it contributes to a better understanding of the role of proof-of-work in known systems that "work in practice, but [so far] not in theory" [11] .
If our claim holds, we have found a way to build permissionless distributed ledgers with finality based on proof-of-work. However, proof-of-work is a very wasteful way of establishing consensus. It should be avoided whenever possible. Only if there is no alternative to proof-of-work, HotPoW should be considered as a replacement for Nakamoto consensus.
A PROTOCOL DEPENDENCIES
We document relevant parts of the implementation which were omitted in Sect. 3. 
B DETECTING ATTACKS
Each vote is linked to one ATV. By assumption (Sect. 2), the time between every two ATVs is exponentially distributed and ATVs happen at rate λ. A fully interconnected node in a network without adversary can expect to learn of new votes (and own ATVs combined) at the same rate λ. A node can test the hypothesis of being attacked (eclipsed) based only on observing the incoming votes. Table 3 shows after what amount of time (relative to block time), during which a node did not receive a single vote, this node can rule out natural behaviour at confidence p = 0.001. We observe that bigger quorums sizes increase the detectability of eclipse attacks. With a quorum size of 128 an eclipsed node could react after 20 % of the expected block time, while for Bitcoin it takes almost 7 times the expected block time.
